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Individualism and the Social Contract  
as Expressions of the Critical Genesis of the State 
in light of the Views  
of N. Machiavelli and Th. Hobbes
Abstract: The article discusses modern theories of individualism as the basis 
of the social contract and hence as the source of the modern state. The author analyses 
N. Machiavelli’s and Th. Hobbes’ concepts of the state, which emerged as a response 
to a situation where scholastic visions of the state and the human being had lost their 
appeal. He also draws attention to the fact that the study of human nature and the ways 
to control it is the goal of modern political philosophies and that passion as the driv-
ing force of human actions first appeared in political philosophical thought thanks 
to Machiavelli, later to be taken up and developed by Hobbes. According to Machiavelli, 
individualism is based in a specific self seeking fulfillment, which can attain set goals 
thanks to two driving forces: virtue and fortune. Machiavelli’s individual treats others as 
objects; the goal of their actions is the desire for profit. Machiavelli’s thought—a prince 
establishes the state and devotes himself entirely to it (which is also good for the others 
as it takes them out of the state of war)—is taken up by Hobbes. A human being is guided 
by the senses—men have wants and desires. The life’s goal is self-fulfillment; the high-
est good, self-preservation. As in Machiavelli, the pursuit of self-realization (striving 
for peace, that is avoiding war for fear of death) leads to the social contract. The social 
contract is not the common will of the society but a consensus reached by the parties 
regarding giving up some of the individual rights, that is a consensus reached by all 
individuals. Hence, by realizing the self, people realize peace, that is the highest good 
for individuals (of course, both the state of war and the state of peace are only hypotheti-
cal—constructs which justify the State, not empirical facts). In both views the prince 
is one (for himself), everybody can be the prince, and it is impossible not to want to be 
the prince (quitting the pursuit means death). The pursuit of the fulfillment of the ego 
is the only course of action for the prince, and at the same time a course of action good 
for all other princes by virtue of the social contract. This is the meaning of the state—
a contract between princes: always together and always apart.
Keywords: individualism, social contract, N. Machiavelli, T. Hobbes
The criticism of the Renaissance era found expression in political 
philosophy in—among other things—the rejection of the conception 
of the state as a certain being necessary due to nature or the will of God, 
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as a natural environment for human life. In answer to the dominant 
scholastic conceptions of the state, “new” models of the state of nature 
and attempts at ending it arose. In the past several centuries, view-
points regarding the social contract have taken on various forms, both 
in terms of the subjective, as well as objective side of the contract.1 One 
condition of entering into the contract remains unchanged, however. 
That condition is individualism. 
The pioneer who took on a typical modern way of perceiving the state 
is Niccolò Machiavelli.2 Leo Strauss describes the so-called Machiavel-
lian breakthrough thusly:
[…] the founder of modern political philosophy is Machiavelli. He attempted—with 
success—to break with the entire tradition of political philosophy. He compared his 
achievement with the achievements of people like Columbus. He asserted that he had 
discovered a new moral continent. This assertion is well-grounded; his political 
teachings are “completely new.” The only question concerns whether the continent 
discovered by Machiavelli is inhabitable by man.3
Machiavelli builds his conception on the basis of an analysis 
of the surrounding world and a synthesis of historical events. Vale-
riu Marcu characterizes the world of the de Medici’s, Florence, Rome, 
1 See Z. Rau and M. Chmieliński, “Wprowadzenie,” in: Umowa społeczna i jej krytycy w myśli 
politycznej i prawnej, Z. Rau i M. Chmieliński, eds. (Warszawa: Scholar, 2010), pp. 7–34.
2 See P. Manent, Intelektualna historia liberalizmu, trans. M. Miszalski. (Kraków: Znak, 
1994), pp. 13–37. In The Originality of Machiavelli, I. Berlin comments on this breakthrough 
thusly: “There is, therefore, something extraordinary in the fact that he completely ignores 
the concepts and categories—the routine paraphernalia—in terms of which the best-known think-
ers and scholars of his day were accustomed to express themselves. [...] Only Marsilio before him 
had dared to do this: and [...] it is a dramatic break with the past. The absence of Christian psy-
chology and theology—sin, grace, redemption, salvation—need cause less surprise: few contempo-
rary humanists speak in such terms. The medieval heritage has grown very thin. But, and this 
is more noteworthy, there is no trace of Platonic or Aristotelian teleology, no reference to any ideal 
order, to any doctrine of man’s place in nature in the great chain of being [...] There is nothing 
here of what Popper has called ‘essentialism,’ a prior certainty directly revealed to reason or intu-
ition about the unalterable development of men or social groups in certain directions, in pursuit 
of goals implanted in them by God or by nature. The method and the tone are empirical. Even 
Machiavelli’s theory of historical cycles is not metaphysically guaranteed. As for religion, it is for 
him not much more than a socially indispensable instrument, so much utilitarian cement: the cri-
terion of the worth of a religion is its role as a promoter of solidarity and cohesion.” <http://berlin.
wolf.ox.ac.uk/published_works/ac/machiavelli.pdf> (01.05.2015).
3 L. Strauss, Sokratejskie pytania, trans. P. Maciejko. (Warszawa: Aletheia, 1998), p. 91.
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that great breakthrough of the Renaissance, and the bidding farewell 
to of the old world this way: 
Heaven seemed empty to them, and the earth full of possibilities for the sly, 
for the ruthless. A mixture of courage, venality, and adroitness decided about their 
way of life and relationship to others. It became fashionable to loudly praise things 
that were usually done only in secret, it did not damage their dignity to live with-
out an ideal appearance beyond honesty, beyond family, beyond love, beyond church, 
beyond courage. They thought they could live without the curtain that always has 
to someone cover all things and feelings, and did not shudder at looking at the hearts 
of their own and others. Politics is cleansed of all moral ideas. Such a world, without 
any heavenly idea, with any fantasy, against any assumption that is not obvious, 
without any illusions, constituted the political realism of the Florentines.4 
This political realism is captured in the story about Cesena told 
by the author of the Prince.
Once the duke had taken over Romagna, he found it had been commanded by Impo-
tent lords who had been readier to despoil their subjects than to correct them, 
and had given their subjects matter for disunion, not for union. Since that province 
was quite full of robberies, quarrels, and every other kind of insolence, he judged 
It necessary to give it good government, if he wanted to reduce It to peace and obe-
dience to a kingly arm. So he put there Messer Remirro de Orco, a cruel and ready 
man, to whom he gave the fullest power. In a short time Remirro reduced it to peace 
and unity, with the very greatest reputation for himself. Then the duke judged that 
such excessive authority was not necessary, because he feared that it might become 
hateful; and he set up a civil court in the middle of the province, with a most excel-
lent, where each city had its advocate. And because he knew that past rigors had 
generated some hatred for Remirro, to purge the spirits of that people and to gain 
them entirely to himself, he wished to show that if any cruelty had been committed, 
this had not come from him but from the harsh nature of his minister. And having 
seized this opportunity, he had him placed one morning in the piazza at Cesena 
in two pieces, with a piece of wood and a bloody knife beside him. The ferocity of this 
spectacle left the people at once satisfied and stupefied.5
4 V. Marcu, Machiavelli. Szkoła władzy, trans. M. Tarnowski. (Warszawa: Powszechna Spółka 
Wydawnicza “Płomień”, 1938), p. 44.
5 N. Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. and introduction by H.C. Mansfield, 2nd edition (Chicago–
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 29–30.
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The above story raises many questions in terms of how interpreta-
tion, but one thing is for certain: even a loyal servant can be killed if his 
death will bring about peace in the state, which is the highest good. 
His peculiar pacifism is based on the technical utilization of human 
passion and on the Prince’s strength. The Prince is the omnipotent Self, 
which, detached from values, or treating them technically,6 fulfills itself 
through conquest, but also through peace for his subjects. 
Machiavelli reveals the monstrosity of a man, an individual Self, 
who wants to fulfill himself: 
[…] men are happy while they are in accord, and as they come into discord, unhappy. 
I judge this indeed, that it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune 
is a woman; and it is necessary, if one wants to hold her down, to beat her and strike her 
down. And one sees that she lets herself be won more by the impetuous than by those 
who proceed coldly. And so always, like a woman, she is the friend of the young, because 
they are less cautious, more ferocious, and command her with more audacity.7 […] truly 
it is a very natural and ordinary thing to desire to acquire, and always, when men do 
it who can, they will be praised or not blamed […].8 
Machiavelli distinguishes two causal forces of our actions: virtu 
and fortune. It is not the case that man is subject only to fortune 
and cannot influence his own fate:9 
6 “High values esteems by the classical tradition, such as justice and magnanimity, are con-
sidered by Machiavelli unrealistic, impossible to realize. Thus, they are made elements of rhetoric 
to be directed at the people, whose ‘enlightenment’ the Florentine considers unlikely. However, 
the ruling classes may be ‘enlightened,’ as their ‘humor’ and great ambitions or greed predispose 
them to dominate others. The enlightenment, especially of the young who aspire to rule, should 
consist in freeing them of moral inhibitions. Then, on making progress in ‘knowledge of the world,’ 
whose practical consequences boil down to a utilitarian treatment of religious faith and the most 
sacred convictions of the people.” R. Piekarski, Koncepcja cnót politycznych Machiavellego na tle 
elementów klasycznej etyki cnót (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2007), p. 458.
7 N. Machiavelli, The Prince…, p. 101.
8 N. Machiavelli, The Prince…, p. 14.
9 I. Berlin characterizes the situation thusly: “The assumption is that the blessings of the clas-
sical age can be restored (if fortune is not too unpropitious) by enough knowledge and will, by vir-
tue on the part of a leader, and by appropriately trained and bravely and skillfully led citizens. 
There are no intimations of an irrevocably determined flow of events; neither fortuna nor necessita 
dominate the whole of existence; there are no absolute values which men ignore or deny to their 
inevitable doom.” The Originality... <http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/published_works/ac/machiavelli.
pdf> (01.05.2015). 
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Therefore, these princes of ours who have been in their principalities for many years 
may not accuse fortune when they have lost them afterwards, but their own indo-
lence; for, never having thought that quiet times could change (which is a common 
defect of men, not to take account of the storm during the calm), when later the times 
became adverse, they thought of fleeing and not of defending themselves. And they 
hoped that their peoples, disgusted with the insolence of the victors, would call 
them back. This course is good when others are lacking; but it is indeed bad to have 
put aside other remedies for this one. For one should never fall in the belief you can 
find someone to pick you up. Whether it does not happen or happens, it is not secu-
rity for you, because that defense was base and did not depend on you. And those 
defenses alone are good, are certain, and are lasting, that depend on you yourself 
and on your virtue.10 
The individual can do a lot, and fortune also means a lot. The aware 
Self should reconcile these opposites. A good prince knows how to find 
agreement (he is a fox), i.e. he knows when to act to change fate, 
and when to read the surrounding reality with stoic calm. A good prince 
is an effective prince. 
The prince would like his people to be governed by good laws 
and to live in peace, but from his survey of the surrounding Italian 
republics, a completely different condition of man emerges. It is that 
of the individual treating others as the objects of his actions and acting 
according to a desire for profit. 
And men have less hesitation to offend one who makes himself loved than one who 
makes himself feared; for love is held by a chain of obligation, which, because men 
are wicked, is broken at every opportunity for their own utility, but fear is held 
by a dread of punishment that never sakes you. The prince should nonetheless make 
himself feared in such a mode that if he does not acquire love, he escapes hatred, 
because being feared and not being hated can go to get her very well. This he will 
always do if he abstains from the property of his citizens and his subjects, and from 
their women; and if he also needs to proceed against someone’s life, he must do 
it when there is suitable justification and manifest cause for it. But above all, he must 
abstain from the property of others, because men forget the death of father more 
quickly than the loss of a patrimony.11
10 N. Machiavelli, The Prince..., p. 97.
11 N. Machiavelli, The Prince..., pp. 66–67.
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In this world, the Prince (with a capital “p”) is the starting point 
and endpoint. He understands fortune and in him virtu is concen-
trated. The Prince-Self may be a tyrant and republican, but he and only 
he has the power to decide about the state. The created state is his 
only life. Wojciech Kaute comments on this situation thusly: “Machia-
velli rids Europe of illusions. The world broke into two parts; more pre-
cisely: only the second part is left: the prince, nobles, and people. There 
is no goal. The image of man which the author of the Prince presents 
is neither optimistic, nor pessimistic.”12 Man is what he is. Neither good, 
nor evil. It is the passions.13 This is the type of individual that emerges 
from Machiavelli’s worldview.
The continuator of Machiavelli’s thought in the context of his con-
ception of man was Thomas Hobbes. “Of course, there are essential dif-
ferences between Machiavelli and Hobbes […]. However, the emphasis 
on rivalry, external values, and the search for safety and profit creates 
a significant connection between them.”14
Some are helped by philosophy, others lack it. Thus, the cause of all of these benefits 
is philosophy. The usefulness of moral and social philosophy should be evaluated 
not so much on the basis of those benefits that cognition bestows on it, as on the basis 
of that misfortune that touches us when we lack it. All misfortunes that can be 
avoided by human effort have their source in war, especially civil war; from it come 
murders, loneliness, and a deficiency in all things. The cause of all of this is not that 
people want these things, since they only want what seems good to them; and it is not 
the case that people do not know that these things are evil; for, is there a man who 
would not understand that murder and poverty are evil and disagreeable for him? 
The cause of civil war is that people do not know the causes of war and peace and that 
there are few people who have discovered their duties, thanks to which peace arises 
and endures, that means: so few know the true principle of how to live. The cogni-
zance of this principle is moral philosophy.15 
12 W. Kaute, W poszukiwaniu dobrego życia. U filozoficznych podstaw głównych orientacji poli-
tycznego myślenia (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2011), p. 50.
13 “If Machiavelli had been right, this world be a valley of tears, a blood bath, a villainous 
fraud, the vanity of vanities, an indecent story, an incomprehensible joke, while the political com-
munity would be, above all, a great, incomprehensible animal of Plato’s.” R. Piekarski, Koncep-
cja..., p. 468. 
14 R. Piekarski, Koncepcja..., p. 463.
15 R. Piekarski, Koncepcja..., p. 18.
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Therefore, cognizing the nature of man and finding a way to temper 
his desires is the task of political philosophy. Hobbes searches for a solu-
tion through connecting the attributes (passions) of man with a geo-
metric method16 and determinism17 that stem from a certain variety 
of deism.18 
[“Thought” is the] “presentation or image of some quality or other feature of a body 
outside ourselves, which is usually called an object. This object acts on the ears, 
eyes, and other parts of the human body, and acting variously, elicits various images. 
The prototype of all of them is what we call a sensory impression. (For, there is no 
idea in the human mind that would not have initially, completely or partially, been 
born in the sensory organs). Everything else derives from this prototype.19 
The basis of all thought is empirical cognition. The senses are first, 
which does not mean they are certain. Man cognizes, but he also desires 
and lusts. But first he cognizes, experiences. He may lust later. “We can 
only lust for what is known to us.”20 
Reason suggests a solution to this dilemma. We must emphasize right away that rea-
son plays a rather peculiar role in the author of Leviathan’s vision. It is not the high-
16 See W. Tyburski, A. Wachowiak, R. Wiśniewski, Historia filozofii i etyki do współczesności 
(Toruń: Dom Organizatora, 2002), p. 311.
17 “Philosophical determinism, which Hobbes represents, solely develops a thought that 
is well-known to theologians of the old church, who also dealt with practical wisdom, namely, 
that all things and all matters remain linked to one another. This thought can be expressed 
in two ways; both expressions often diverge from one another, but always end up connected once 
more: 1) That the world itself is logical […], 2) That being and thought have nothing to do with one 
another, and that mechanical and physical consequences are the only reality […].” F. Tönnies, 
Thomas Hobbes. Życie jego i nauka, trans. L. Karpińska (Warszawa: skład główny w Księgarni 
Gebethnera i Wolffa, 1903) p. 197.
18 See Z. Łubieński, Religia i Kościół Kościół systemie filozoficznym Hobbesa (Lwów: Książnica–
Atlas, 1924), p. 6. 
19 F. Tönnies, Thomas Hobbes. Życie..., p. 197. 
20 In his Znaczenie pojęcia umowy w systemie filozoficznym Hobbes’a (Lwów: Książnica–
Atlas, 1931), p. 4,  Z. Łubieński makes the following comments on sensory cognition: “Man’s 
actions are, in essence, the result of the influences of his surroundings. Man does what causes 
him pleasure, pleasure avoids disagreeable sensations. This matter is complicated by the fact 
that by virtue of image and memory association, our present and past sensations mix with one 
another, while the present feeling is increased or decreased with the thought of the benefit or harm 
that the given thing may bring in the future. This being the case, is not only temporary pleasure 
of any sort that is decisive in eliciting a given action, but the fullest, most enduring, and most 
intense possible satisfaction of the entire being. This justification of this satisfaction is, again, 
only in the fact that it constitutes a sign of the enhancement of vital motion. The enhancement 
of life is, then, the proper end to which everyone aspires, whether they want to or not.” 
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est faculty of man, to which all other faculties are subject, but [is—R. M.] something 
instrumental—a refined tool in the service of the will to power.21 
Man thinks only of one thing—how to satisfy his will to power. This ful-
fillment is the only good. Hobbes’ epistemology leads to the conclusion that 
the greatest good is self-preservation. “In one word, we can describe Hobbes’ 
position in ethics as ruthless pure utilitarianism.”22 Analyzing the concepts 
of good and evil, Hobbes emphasized their substantial, utilitarian raison 
d’être. “Every man, for his own part, calleth that which pleaseth, and is 
delightful to himself GOOD; and that EVIL which displeaseth him […].”23 
Hobbes avoided endowing the ideas of good and evil with a metaphysical 
sense; rather, he treated them as psychological categories.24
An expression of this desire of “good” is a permanent lust for power.
The passions that most of all cause the difference of wit, are principally, the more 
or less desire of power, of riches, of knowledge, and of honour. All which may be reduced 
to the first, that is, desire of power. For riches, knowledge, and honour, are but several 
sorts of power.25 
Man is a being that permanently satifies his power. 
So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual 
and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this, 
is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained 
to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure 
the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.26 
Further, Hobbes asserts that this power cannot be stopped. 
21 Z. Stawrowski, “Teologia polityczna Thomasa Hobbesa,” Civitas, nr 8, 2004, p. 124.
22 J. Paygert, Nauka Tomasza Hobbesa w stosunku do religii i kościoła (Kraków: Drukarnia 
Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 1916), p. 393.
23 T. Hobbes, “Human Nature,” in: The Elements of Law Natural and Politic (Oxford–
New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 44. 
24 See R. Tokarczyk, Hobbes. Zarys żywota i myśli (Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 1998), p. 68.
25 Th. Hobbes, “Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical 
and Civil,” in: The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. III (London: C. Richards, 1839), p. 61.
26 Th. Hobbes, “Leviathan…,” pp. 85–86.
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And therefore, a man who has no great passion for any of these things; but is, as men 
term it, indifferent; though he may be so far a good man, as to be free from giv-
ing offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a great fancy, or much judgment. 
For the thoughts are to the desires, as scouts, and spies, to range abroad, and find 
the way to the things desired; all steadiness of the mind’s motion, and all quickness 
of the same, proceeding from thence: for as to have no desire, is to be dead: so to have 
weak passions, is dullness […].27 
Man either aspires to increasing his sphere of power, or does not exist. 
Man immanently fulfills himself. Not fulfilling oneself is equivalent 
to not existing. 
To consider them behind is glory.
To consider them before is humility. […]
To fall on the sudden is disposition to weep.
To see another fall, disposition to laug.
To see one out-gone whom we would not is pity.
To see one out-go we would not, is indignation. […]
And to forsake the course is to die.28
It would be difficult to find a clearer thought concerning the condi-
tion of “Self.” The “Self” is alone and only it counts. One can be either 
an object of cognition, or the only subject. “For such is the nature of men, 
that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, 
or more eloquent, or more learned; yet they will hardly believe there be 
many so wise as themselves; for they see their own with at hand, and other 
men’s at a distance”29 It cannot be any other way. Such is man. In the end, 
he is only a body. And a solitary body, at that. Man is matter in motion, 
determined and directed. Man is a concrete, live “Self.” Lustful and solitary. 
Again, men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping 
company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man loo-
keth that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himself: 
27 Th. Hobbes, “Leviathan…,” pp. 61–62.
28 Th. Hobbes, “Human Nature,” in: The Elements of Law Natural and Politic (Oxford–New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 59–60.
29 Th. Hobbes, “Leviathan…,”  p. 111.
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and upon all signs of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he 
dares, (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far 
enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his contem-
ners, by damage; and from others, by the example.30
 Man does not immanently aspire to life in a community. He is alone. 
He is solitary and—as Jan Paygert writes—
by nature everyone desires welfare for himself, so the greatest good for each is his 
own self, self-preservation, and vice versa, the greatest evil for each is death, espe-
cially when it is tied with anguish. However, even death may be desired, and so 
is good, if life has become too much of a burden.31 
Hobbes’ anthropology is not “pleasant.” It is not optimistic. It is “real.” 
Anti-humanitarian in the naïve sense of utopian visions.32 Man is a def-
inite individualist, who, if he needs to form a community with some-
one, will only form one based on the fulfillent of his own ego.33 Peo-
ple who fulfill the desire to power fall into a state of war,34 in which 
“[…] the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”35 Hobbes 
find three causes of war that are components of the desire to power. 
They are rivalry, mistrust, and the desire of fame.36All of them are 
fulfilled in the state of nature. The state of nature can be understood 
as an empirical state—it is a place of war where no state exists that 
could uphold people, or a certain theoretical state that justifies the state. 
The first model appears where Hobbes describes civil war,37 the second 
30 Th. Hobbes, “Leviathan…,” p. 112.
31 J. Paygert, Spór i siła—a państwo i prawo. Filozoficzno-prawna nauka Tomasza Hobbesa 
w historyczno-krytycznem oświetleniu (Lwów: Z drukarni Wł. Łozińskiego, 1913), p. 36. 
32 R. Piotrowski, Od materii Świata to materii Państwa. Z filozofii Thomasa Hobbesa (Kraków: 
Universitas, 2000), p. 115.
33 R. Tuck, Hobbes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 65.
34 “[…] that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they 
are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man.” 
Th. Hobbes, “Leviathan…,” pp. 112–113.
35 Th. Hobbes, “Leviathan…,” p. 113.
36 See Th. Hobbes, “Leviathan…,” p. 206.
37 See Th. Hobbes, “Leviathan…,” pp. 406–419.
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is not a model that can be verified empirically, and at the same time, 
precisely through the example of our daily behavior, can be imagined.38
“What can unite them? The answer is obvious: art.”39 Art, by virtue 
of which that mortal God arises. King of all children of pride. Leviathan.
The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them 
from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure 
them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, 
they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to confer all their power 
and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their 
wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will […] This is more than consent, or con-
cord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by convenant 
of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every 
man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this 
assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and autho-
rize all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person 
is called a COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. This is the generation of that 
great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god, to which 
we owe under the immortal God, our peace and defence. […] And he that carrieth 
this person, is called SOVEREIGN, and said to have sovereign power; and every one 
besides, his SUBJECT.40
So, the Sovereign emerges by virtue of the social contract. Miłowit 
Kuniński formulates three ways of understanding the theory of the social 
contract41—each of these forms is valid and each has its critics, but these 
three standpoints are connected by one thing—a break with the tradition 
38 Hobbes writes thusly about opponents of the concept of a state of war: “Let him therefore 
consider with himself, when taking a journey, he arms himself, and seek to go well accompanied; 
when going to sleep, he locks his doors; […].” Th. Hobbes, “Leviathan…,” p. 208.
39 P. Manent, Intelektualna historia liberalizmu, p. 40.
40 Th. Hobbes, “Leviathan…,” pp. 157–158.
41 “1. The standard understanding of Hobbes’ theory of the social contract, where individu-
als found in the state of nature are not connected with each other by moral and social bonds, 
and in aspiring to satisfy the needs that serve to uphold their lives, they usurp the means they 
consider necessary to attain that end; 2. The state of nature as an intermediate state between 
political states, where a political state is the negation of the state of nature and the way of elimi-
nating its greatest evil—sudden death; 3. The state of nature as a point of departure and tran-
sition to a political state, when every man is an enemy to every other man; this transition may 
be significantly weakened, since it is possible to ally oneself with others for defense purposes 
and to receive aid from allies.” M. Kuniński, “Problem stanu natury i stanu politycznego w teo-
rii umowy społecznej Tomasza Hobbesa,” in: Umowa społeczna i jej krytycy w myśli politycznej 
i prawnej, Z. Rau and M. Chmieliński, eds. (Warszawa: Scholar, 2010), pp. 118–123.
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that viewed the genesis and justification of the state in the will of God 
or in the conception of man understood as zoon politikon.
Summarizing the stance regarding individualism, we can say that 
it grew out of the foundation of early modern philosophy. N. Machiavelli 
was the first to express such a vivid statement defining man through 
his passions. We can say that in a certain sense, it was at that time that 
the scholastic formula defining man as a person, and society as a certain 
whole instead of a (spontaneous) interest group or rational (contract) asso-
ciation, was exhausted. It was N. Machiavelli who prompted the devel-
opment of this idea. In my opinion, Th. Hobbes best developed the idea 
of unrestrained passions as a causal force of human action. 
His desire of power is the most complete expression of lust. 
For the author of Leviathan, desire of power is written into the whole phil-
osophical system as a necessary, but not sole, force. Laws of nature also 
exist, which command us to aspire to peace. The Leviathan is necessary 
because of the fear of death and laws of nature. It is also strong by our 
desire for power, from which it is created. But we also give up a piece 
of our rights to everything with a view to peace, which is the highest good. 
Thomas Hobbes’ social contract became the inspiration for many 
later versions of this idea, very differently justified, both through 
rational choice and spontaneous order (as in the works of Robert Noz-
ick). Setting aside the discussion on the validity of standpoint regard-
ing N. Machiavelli’s and Th. Hobbes’ conceptions of man, it seems that 
we are entitled to say that the theses of these thinkers were an answer 
to the exhaustion of a certain scholastic method of justifying the state 
and the definition of man. If the view of human nature described above, 
being the source of authorization for the state created on the basis 
of the social contract, results from a critical understanding of the sov-
ereign (dogmatically understood by scholastics), then this criticism was 
very significant for the future of the state, both in the social sphere 
(concerning, among other things, the sphere of rights and subjectivism 
of the individual) and legal sphere (concerning the empire of the sover-
eign, and thus civil rights).
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Radosław Małek
Indywidualizm i umowa społeczna jako wyraz krytycznej 
genezy państwa w ujęciu N. Machiawellego i T. Hobbesa
Streszczenie: W artykule zostały zanalizowane nowożytne koncepcje indywiduali-
zmu będącego podstawą umowy społecznej, a zatem źródłem nowożytnego państwa. 
Autor analizuje koncepcje państwa N. Machiavellego i Th. Hobbesa, stanowiące odpo-
wiedź na wyczerpanie się scholastycznych wizji państwa i człowieka. Zwraca także 
uwagę, iż poznanie natury człowieka i sposobów jej opanowania stanowi cel nowożyt-
nych filozofii polityki. Podkreśla, iż namiętność jako siła sprawcza ludzkich działań 
pojawia się w filozofii polityki dzięki myśli N. Machiavellego, po czym została rozwi-
nięta w filozofii Th. Hobbesa. Indywidualizm w koncepcji Machiavellego opiera się 
na konkretnym Ja, realizującym siebie, które może osiągać swoje cele dzięki dwóm 
siłom sprawczym (virtu, fortuna). Jednostka Machiavellego innych traktuje przedmio-
towo, a celem jej działania jest chęć zysku. Myśl Machiavellego, wyrażającą się w prze-
konaniu iż Książę tworzy Państwo i jedynie w Państwie się realizuje (co jednocześnie 
jest dobre dla innych bo wyprowadza ich ze stanu wojny), kontynuuje Th. Hobbes. 
Człowiek to istota zmysłowa – pragnąca i pożądająca. Celem jego życia jest spełnienie, 
a najwyższym dobrem – zachowanie samego siebie. Jak u Machiavellego, realizacja 
własnego Ja (dążenie do pokoju czyli ucieczka przed wojną ze strachu przed śmiercią) 
prowadzi do umowy społecznej. Umowa to nie wspólna wola społeczeństwa lecz kon-
sensus stron umowy (dotyczący rezygnacji z części uprawnień do wszystkiego), czyli 
wszystkich jednostek. Tak więc, realizując Ja, realizujemy pokój, czyli najważniej-
sze dobro dla jednostek (oczywiście tak stan wojny, jak i pokoju są tylko hipotetycz-
ne, są pewną protezą do uzasadnienia państwa, a nie faktem empirycznym). W obu 
koncepcjach Książę jest jeden (dla siebie) i każdy może być Księciem – i nie można 
nie chcieć być Księciem (porzucenie biegu to śmierć). Bieg do realizacji ego to jedyna 
droga dla Księcia – i jednocześnie droga dobra dla wszystkich innych Książąt mocą 
umowy społecznej, a to właśnie znaczy państwo (umowa Księcia z Księciem, czyli 
zawsze razem i zawsze osobno). 
Słowa kluczowe: indywidualizm, umowa społeczna, N. Machiavelli, T. Hobbes.
